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THE USE OF EMINENT DOMAIN FOR ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT IN BALTIMORE, MARYLAND: TEN YEARS
AFTER KELO
ELVA E. TILLMAN ∗
“Restricting the definition of ‘public use’ in the context of
eminent domain could tie the hands of local government
attempting to redevelop brownfields or economically depressed
neighborhoods and business districts. It might very well curtail a
community’s ability to direct new growth and development to
areas where urban infrastructure and services already exist, a
key component of smart growth initiatives.”1
INTRODUCTION
Baltimore City, Maryland was founded in 1729; 2 it was incorporated
between 1796 and 1797. 3 At that time, it was part of Baltimore County. 4
In 1851, it became an independent city. 5 The Port of Baltimore, which has
marked its 300th birthday, 6 is generally recognized as the second largest
seaport in the Mid-Atlantic. 7 Since its founding, Baltimore has been known
for both innovation and urban tension. Over the past three centuries, the
city has experienced phases of development and decline, both of which
have warranted extraordinary measures. In decline, Baltimore, dubbed the
“City of Neighborhoods,” has struggled to reinvent itself.
More
specifically, in the face of population decline, deteriorating infrastructure,
grime, crime, and civil unrest the center city has searched for tools to
revitalize itself. However, the private sector has not prompted the quick
emergence of economic development without government assistance. In
Baltimore City, eminent domain has been used as a tool to remove blight

© 2016 Elva E. Tillman.
∗ Principal Counsel, Department of Law (City Solicitor’s Office) Baltimore, Maryland.
1. APA Urges Court to Retain Eminent Domain for Economic Development, AMERICAN
PLANNING ASS’N (Feb. 17, 2005), https://www.planning.org/news releases/2005/feb17-2.htm
(discussing the potential impact of Kelo v. New London on urban economic development).
2. SUZANNE ELLERY GREENE, BALTIMORE: AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY 4 (1980).
3. Id. at 65.
4. Id. at 66.
5. Id. at 110.
6. PORT OF BALTIMORE, http://portofbaltimore300.org/history/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2015).
7. Id.
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and certain racial and socio-economic groups. 8 Baltimore has also used
eminent domain to stimulate economic development.
While many critics bemoan the use of eminent domain, private
development has needed stimulation.
In Baltimore, government
assemblage of land for redevelopment has spurred economic development.
In 1961, the development of the Charles Center marked Baltimore’s
rebirth—eminent domain was used to assemble the land for that rebirth.9 A
decade later, acquisition through eminent domain was used in the Inner
Harbor project; that project has stimulated worldwide interest.10 More
recently, the City has used eminent domain along with negotiation in the
area just east of the Harbor to redevelop the Harbor East community. 11 The
city has also relied on eminent domain in neighborhoods adjacent to
significant institutions such as Johns Hopkins Hospital in East Baltimore
and the University of Maryland Professional Schools in West Baltimore.
Around Johns Hopkins Hospital, the East Baltimore Development Initiative
(“EBDI”) is spearheading a range of housing development and commercial
support facilities projects.12 Similarly, West Baltimore has a thriving Bio
Technology Park consisting of twelve acres on the west side of the
University of Maryland’s campus. Once completed, the “BioPark” will
include 1.8 million square feet of laboratory and office space in twelve
buildings with garage parking and landscaped parks. 13
Eminent domain, along with negotiation and other acquisition tools,
has been an effective approach to revitalizing Baltimore City. The use of
eminent domain for economic development makes good economic sense.
Redevelopment through eminent domain has increased the City’s tax base
and attracted other new, private developments, new residents, and
employment opportunities. The Hope VI projects, 14 which involved some
eminent domain acquisitions and the redevelopment of the public housing
projects such as Pleasant View Gardens (in East Baltimore) and Heritage

8. ANTERO PIETILA, NOT IN MY NEIGHBORHOOD: HOW BIGOTRY SHAPED A GREAT
AMERICAN CITY 50–51, 54–56 (2010).
9. BALTIMORE SAVOIR FAIR: A DISCRIMINATING GUIDE TO THE CITY’S BEST SHOPS,
BOUTIQUES, RESTAURANTS, UNIQUE SERVICES, AND ATTRACTIONS, INTRODUCTION (1984).
10. Id.
11. See Zografos v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 165 Md. App. 80, 89–90, 884 A.2d 770,
775 (2005) (discussing the City’s condemnation of property in Fells Point as part of an “Urban
Renewal Plan”).
12. See generally Phillip A. Hummel, East Side Story: The Redevelopment of East Baltimore,
15 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 97 (2008).
13. THE BIOPARK, http://www.umbiopark.com/BioPark/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2015).
14. The Revitalization of Severely Distressed Public Housing, or “Hope VI,” grew from a
National Action Plan to eradicate severely distressed public housing, spearheaded by the National
Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing. See Revitalization of Severely Distressed
Public Housing (HOPE VI), U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEV.,
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/hudprograms/hopevi (last visited Nov. 17, 2015).
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Crossing and the Townes at the Terraces (in West Baltimore), have
revitalized the residential and commercial scene in Baltimore. 15 Baltimore
City is working with private developers, and it has used eminent domain to
recreate whole neighborhoods.
Well before this concrete evidence existed, the Maryland appellate
courts formally recognized that the use of eminent domain made good
economic sense. In 1924, the Court of Appeals decided Marchant v. Mayor
and City Council of Baltimore, 16 which involved a petition to condemn land
for the development of the Baltimore harbor.17 The petition particularly
described shore lands, together with “all riparian and aquatic rights of the
[defendants] . . . as the owner . . . of said property.” 18 More specifically, the
land was condemned for the purposes of implementing a comprehensive
plan for harbor development.19 The Maryland General Assembly had made
provisions for harbor development. On appeal, the appellant land owner
raised a number of procedural issues about how the condemnation was
done; the Marchant court resolved those issues in favor of the City of
Baltimore. 20
Later, in 1975, thirty years before Kelo v. City of New London,21 the
Maryland Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of economic
development takings in Maryland. 22 The court specifically held that
condemning private property for the development of an industrial park
meets the “public use” requirement for eminent domain. 23 This is an
example of how Maryland courts historically have interpreted the “public
use” requirement in condemnation cases broadly and have “almost always”
deferred to the legislature’s decision to use eminent domain. 24
This Essay provides a review of legislative and judicial responses to
Kelo in the State of Maryland during the past ten years. More specifically,
the use of eminent domain in Baltimore City has spurred the evolution of
such appellate court decisions in the State of Maryland. This Essay also
offers some advice to minimize the potential of what critics of eminent
domain have characterized as the abusive use of eminent domain.

15. Jessica Valdez, Troubled West Baltimore Site Gets Fresh Start with Heritage Crossing,
SUN
(July
16,
2003),
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2003-07BALT.
16/news/0307160102_1_murphy-homes-heritage-crossing-grayson.
16. Marchant v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 146 Md. 513, 126 A. 884 (1924).
17. Id. at 516, 126 A. at 885.
18. Id. at 520, 126 A. at 886.
19. Id. at 517, 126 A. at 885.
20. Id.
21. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
22. Id.
23. Prince Georges County v. Collington Crossroads, Inc., 275 Md. 171, 190–91, 339 A.2d
288–89. The case is discussed infra Part III.A.1.
24. Id.
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I. AN OVERVIEW OF KELO
In Kelo, the Supreme Court upheld the taking of private property for
economic development. 25 The facts of the case reveal that the city of New
London, Connecticut approved a development plan that authorized the
construction of a waterfront hotel, restaurants, retail stores, residences, and
office space; in addition, portions of the development area were to be used
for marinas and support services. 26 As part of the development plan, the
city authorized acquisition of property through negotiated sales and eminent
domain. 27 Most of the property was acquired through negotiated sales, but
nine owners refused to sell. 28 These homeowners filed suit in the New
London Superior Court, alleging that the taking of their properties would
violate the “public use” restriction of the Fifth Amendment. 29
Following the conclusions of the Connecticut Supreme Court, the
United States Supreme Court found that the development plan served a
public purpose and therefore constituted a public use under the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 30 The Supreme Court also agreed with the
conclusion of the Connecticut court that the plan was not adopted to benefit
a particular class of identifiable individuals.31 Furthermore, although the
owners’ particular properties were not blighted, the Court gave deference to
the City’s determination that a program of economic rejuvenation for the
overall area was justified. 32 The Kelo Court held that there was no basis for
exempting economic development from the broad definition of “public
purpose.” 33 The Court declined to require a reasonable certainty that the
expected public benefits would accrue and deferred to the City’s
determination of the boundary of the development area.34 Therefore, the
Kelo Court affirmed the judgment of the Connecticut Supreme Court.35
A. The Maryland Response
As discussed in the Introduction, the Maryland Court of Appeals
upheld the constitutionality of economic development takings in Collington

25. 545 U.S. 469, 489–90 (2004).
26. Id. at 472, 474.
27. Id. at 475.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 489–90.
31. Id. at 478, 485 (declining to follow petitioners’ argument for a bright line rule against
eminent domain for economic development and stating that “the government’s pursuit of a public
purpose will often benefit individual private parties”).
32. Id. at 483.
33. Id. at 485.
34. Id. at 488–89.
35. Id. at 490.
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Crossroads—thirty years before Kelo. 36 Of course, that does not mean that
all Marylanders were supportive of the ruling in Kelo. Since Collington
Crossroads, and continuing after Kelo, many interest groups have lobbied
the Maryland General Assembly to adopt legislation to prohibit the use of
eminent domain. Election year efforts seem to be particularly intense
because elected officials want to appear to be responsive to critics of the use
of eminent domain in their bids to be re-elected.
B. The Task Force on Business-Owner Compensation in
Condemnation Proceedings
In July 2004, Maryland’s Governor appointed a Task Force composed
of private, public, and nonprofit organization representatives with
experience in eminent domain to review business-owner compensation in
condemnation proceedings. 37 Although the Task Force was created the year
before the Supreme Court decided Kelo, and thus was not formed
specifically to address that case, the group did consider Kelo as their work
progressed. The group was established to study issues involved in
compensating business owners in condemnation proceedings, such as
whether business goodwill is compensable and if so, how courts can
calculate it in condemnation proceedings. 38 Additionally, the Task Force
studied the feasibility of requiring a displacing public agency to conduct a
study on the impact of condemnation on businesses in the area where
condemnation proceedings take place.39
The Task Force looked at the appropriateness of establishing a fund to
provide financial assistance to businesses impacted by a condemnation
proceeding and the feasibility of shortening the condemnation process for
businesses. 40 A preliminary report was submitted to the Governor and
General Assembly on January 21, 2005, and a final report was submitted on
December 21, 2005; authorization of the Task Force expired December 31,
2005. 41 The impact of the Task Force is reflected below in a discussion of
legislative failure and success.
36. See supra text accompanying notes 23–26.
37. Task Force on Business-Owner Compensation in Condemnation Proceedings,
MARYLAND MANUAL ON-LINE: A GUIDE TO MARYLAND & ITS GOVERNMENT,
http://msa.maryland.gov/msa/mdmanual/26excom/defunct/html/04busin.html (last visited Nov.
20, 2015).
38. REPORT OF THE STATE OF MARYLAND TASK FORCE ON BUSINESS OWNER
COMPENSATION
IN
CONDEMNATION
PROCEEDINGS
44–63
(2005),
http://msa.maryland.gov/msa/mdmanual/26excom/defunct/html/04busin.html (follow “Report,
December 21, 2005” hyperlink). Within the concept of business goodwill, the Task Force focused
on small business goodwill. Id. at 1.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. TASK FORCE ON BUSINESS-OWNER COMPENSATION IN CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS,
supra note 37.
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II. LEGISLATIVE FAILURE AND SUCCESS
It is interesting to review how legislative efforts in Maryland compare
to nationwide trends. Within four months after the Kelo decision, four
states (Michigan, New Mexico, North Dakota, and South Dakota) enacted
eminent domain legislation.42
One state passed a constitutional
amendment. 43 In 2006, the year after the Kelo decision, twenty-one states
passed reforms to limit the use of eminent domain. Most used statutory
provisions, but some undertook constitutional amendments.44 From 2005 to
2006, reforms fell into the following seven broad categories:
1. Prohibiting [the use of] eminent domain for economic
development . . . ;
2. Limiting eminent domain to a “stated public purpose”;
3. Restricting eminent domain to blighted properties or [to] where
an area as a whole is considered blighted;
4. [Imposing] a moratorium on [the use of] eminent domain . . .
for economic development for a stated period while legislative
task forces evaluated the issue;
5. Increasing the compensation amount for condemned property
where it is a person’s principal residence;
6. Imposing greater procedural requirements on eminent domain
use, for example, greater public notice, more public hearings,
good-faith negotiations and elected governing body approval; and
7. Redefining “public use” as possession, occupation or
enjoyment of the property by the public at large, public agencies
or public utilities. 45
In Maryland, after Kelo, in an atmosphere of election year
responsiveness and earnest Task Force efforts, more than forty pieces of
42. In Michigan, Senate Joint Resolution E, passed by the legislature on December 13, 2005,
approved by voters on November 7, 2006; House Bills 5818, 5819 and 5060, all signed into law
on September 20, 2006; House Bill 5820 and 5821, both signed into law on October 3, 2006;
Senate Bill 693, signed into law on September 20, 2006; House Bills 6638 and 6639, both signed
into law on January 8, 2007. In New Mexico, House Bill 393, signed into law on April 3, 2007,
House Bill 401, signed into law on April 3, 2007. In North Dakota, Ballot Measure 2 (sponsored
by citizen initiative), approved by voters on November 7, 2006; Senate Bill 2214 signed into law
on April 5, 2007. In South Dakota, House Bill 1080, signed into law on February 17, 2006.
43. Florida House Bil1 1567 and new constitution amendment, signed into law on May 11,
2006 has been singled out by Castle Coalition in 2007 as “models for other state legislatures.” 50
State Report Card: Tracking Eminent Domain Reform Legislation Since Kelo, CASTLE
COALITION, http://castlecoalition.org/50-state-report-card (last visited Nov. 23, 2015) [hereinafter
50 State Report Card]
44. See generally id.; John C. Murphy, Eminent Domain, 41 MD. B. J. 3, 29 (Nov./Dec.
2008); James L. Thompson & Joseph P. Suntum, The Condemnation Landscape Across the
Country Post-Kelo—A Maryland Perspective, MARYLAND STATE BAR ASS’N, INC.,
http://www.msba.org/sections/realproperty/groundrules/winter2007/eminentdomain.aspx
(last
visited Nov. 23, 2015).
45. Thompson & Suntum, supra note 44.
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legislation were introduced in the General Assembly. 46 Legislation
included efforts to provide business owners with compensation for the loss
of goodwill if the business could not be relocated, as well as the loss of
income during the period the business was interrupted. 47 The primary bills,
Senate Bill 3 and House Bill 1137, were introduced during the 2006
legislative session. 48 The legislation essentially would have required a
specified government unit to make findings in writing before condemning
and transferring private property to a private party for economic
development purposes, established a standard for judicial review of
government units’ findings, provided that damages awarded for the taking
of property used for a business or farm operation may include specified
damages for the loss of “goodwill” under specified circumstance, etc. 49
Local government organizations opposed the bills, and no such legislation
passed that year. 50
In 2007, pared-down versions of the legislation reappeared with
broader support. There seemed to be an agreement that “something”
needed to be done to make property owners under condemnation “whole”
and send a message that government should use eminent domain in a
“responsible” manner. 51
The Maryland General Assembly session
concluded with property owners under eminent domain reaping more
compensation. The legislation passed, allowing a higher compensation
package for property owners, including relocation expenses. For instance,
the legislation raised a $10,000 cap to $60,000 on costs to re-establish a
farm, small business or nonprofit group. 52 The legislation also requires
Maryland state and local governments to initiate eminent domain
proceedings within a four-year period of obtaining authorization.53
III. EMINENT DOMAIN AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT—A SLOWLY
EVOLVING PRACTICE AREA
Over the past forty years, the Maryland Court of Appeals has
sanctioned the use of eminent domain for economic development, while
still observing constitutional standards. The following selected cases
46. See Bill by Subject: Condemnation—2006 Regular Session, GEN. ASSEMBLY OF MD
(2006), http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/webmga/frmmain.aspx?tab+subject3&ys+2006rs/subjects/co.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. 50 State Report Card, supra note 43.
51. See Laura Smitherman, Eminent Domain Bill Passed in Md. Senate, BALT. SUN (Apr. 3,
2007),
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2007-04-03/news/0704030027_1_eminent-domainproperty-owners-bill.
52. 2007 MD. LAWS 1940 (codified as amended at MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. §§ 112501, 12-202, 12-204–12-205.1) (West 2012).
53. Id.
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provide a perspective regarding the Maryland Court of Appeals’ early and
more recent rulings related to eminent domain and economic
development. 54 The case law can be divided into those before Kelo and
those after Kelo. While Maryland courts continue to support the use of
eminent domain for economic development, there is an emphasis on
demonstrating necessity when property is taken immediately via quick-take
condemnation.
A. Before Kelo
Prior to Kelo, the Maryland appellate courts seemed to review their
opinions regarding Baltimore City to sanction the use of eminent domain
for economic development.
1. Prince George’s County v. Collington Crossroads, Inc.
When Collington Crossroads reached the Court of Appeals in 1975,
the court considered “[w]hether the purpose of the condemnation, namely
the development of a multi-industry ‘employment center,’ or ‘industrial
park,’ constitutes the requisite ‘public use’ so as to justify the County’s
exercise of eminent domain.” 55
In 1968, the Maryland General Assembly authorized Prince George’s
County to issue bonds to finance the acquisition of land for the
development and the construction of “public airport facilities and industrial
parks.” 56 On August 22, 1968, the County filed a petition for condemnation
in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County seeking to acquire land to
construct a “public airport facility.” 57 After some time, the County moved
to amend its petition to allow condemnation of the land solely for the
purpose of developing an industrial park. 58 Around the same time, a
fifteen-member Industrial Park Task Force, authorized by the County
government, was assigned to formulate a comprehensive plan of
development for the industrial park. 59 Collington Crossroads’ tract of land
was included as part of the comprehensive plan.60 The plan outlined a
comprehensive development strategy and explained the public benefits that
54. Stephen Demos, Summer Clerk, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of
Law, initially developed the following case summaries as part of a research project undertaken
during his clerkship at the Department of Law (the City Solicitor’s Office) during the summer of
2015. The original summaries have been edited and are included here to provide a context for
discussing Maryland Court of Appeals cases.
55. Prince George’s County v. Collington Crossroads, Inc., 275 Md. 171, 172, 339 A.2d 278,
279 (1975).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 175, 339 A.2d at 280.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 176, 339 A.2d at 281.
60. Id.
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would result from such development and economic growth. 61 Collington
Crossroads opposed the taking. On May 23, 1974, the circuit court
dismissed the County’s amended petition for condemnation, finding that the
purpose of the condemnation was for private use, not public use.62 The
court based its ruling on the fact that the commercial land would ultimately
be owned by private entities. The County appealed the circuit court’s
decision to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals reversed the Circuit Court for Prince George’s
County, concluding that all “projects reasonably designed to benefit the
general public, by significantly enhancing the economic growth of the State
or its subdivisions, are public uses, at least where the exercise of the power
of condemnation provides an impetus which private enterprise cannot
provide.” 63 The Court concluded that the constitutional term “public use” is
not synonymous with physical use or access by the general public. Just
because private businesses or persons will also receive benefit from a
condemnation does not destroy the public character of a project.64
In reaching this conclusion, first, the court relied on the Task Force’s
comprehensive plan and findings indicating that the type of industrial park,
which it considered necessary for the economic well-being of the County,
would be too costly for private developers. 65 Second, the court was
persuaded by the fact that the County would be maintaining significant
control over the industrial park after the land would be sold to private
owners via development covenants and zoning restrictions. 66 Relying on
the precedent of New Central Coal Co. v. George’s Creek Coal & Iron
Co., 67 Pitznogle v. Western Maryland R. R. Co., 68 and Marchant, the court
reasoned that the public character of a condemnation is not necessarily
changed because a private entity will own the property. 69
2. Free State Realty Co. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore
The Maryland Court of Appeals considered four issues in Free State
Realty Co. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore: 70 whether the City had
the authority to acquire the property in question; whether the ordinance of
the City sets forth proper standards, controls or guidelines for the execution

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 177–78, 339 A.2d at 281–82.
Id. at 179, 339 A.2d at 282.
Id. at 191, 339 A.2d at 289.
Id. at 187, 339 A.2d at 286–87.
Id. at 179–80, 339 A.2d at 283.
Id. at 180, 339 A.2d at 283.
37 Md. 537 (1873).
119 Md. 673, 87 A. 917 (1913).
Collington Crossroads, 275 Md. at 187, 339 A.2d at 286–87.
279 Md. 550, 369 A.2d 1030 (1977).
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of the ordinance; or alternatively, whether the administrative agency has
been given the authority or taken the initiative to issue regulations setting
forth standards, controls or guidelines for said execution; whether the taking
was for a public use; and whether the evidence proffered established the
requisite necessity to exercise a “quick-take” condemnation. 71
Baltimore City filed a petition to condemn and a petition for
immediate possession and title to take the leasehold interest in the property
located at 2526 West Franklin Street, in Baltimore, Maryland, (the
“Property”) “for urban renewal purposes.”
At trial, the court considered the right to condemn and the right to
immediate possession as a preliminary matter: 72
[A] building inspector testified that when he visited the subject
property on September 3, 1974, he observed that ‘[w]indows and
doors were broken,’ there ‘was rubbish and debris inside,’ ‘the
house was vacant’ and ‘the grounds were unsanitary.’ Another
employee of the City’s Department of Housing and Community
Development said . . . that when he last visited the property on
July 13, 1975, three days before the hearing on the petition, there
had been no effort made to rehabilitate the dwelling. The author
of the affidavit attached to the petition for immediate possession
testified that the City sought to acquire the property ‘because it
was reported as a poor condition, blighted property,’ invoking the
authority of Ordinance No. 152, § 2(h) approved June 28,
1968. . . . A copy of the letter to the Board of Estimates was filed
as an exhibit in the proceeding. The letter said that the Housing
Commissioner ‘ha[d], along with members of [his] staff,
inspected the properties listed above, and . . . certif[ied] that said
properties [did] meet the . . . requirements’ of Ordinance No. 152,
§ 26(h). 73
Consequently, “the trial judge passed an order in which he found ‘that
it [was] necessary for the [City] to acquire immediate possession and title to
said property.’” 74 Free State Realty Company appealed to the Court of
Special Appeals, which affirmed the lower court’s decision.75 The Court of
Appeals granted Free State’s writ of certiorari and affirmed the lower
court’s holdings for each of the four issues considered. 76

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 551–52, 369 A.2d at 1030–31.
Id. at 553, 369 A.2d at 1031.
Id. at 553–54, 369 A.2d at 1031–32.
Id. at 554, 369 A.2d at 1032 (alterations in original).
Id.
Id.
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The court cited the holding in Master Royalties Corp. v. City of
Baltimore 77 as controlling precedent.78 In its opinion the court further
highlighted the language of the urban renewal ordinance, believing that the
City Council had affirmatively granted such power that it was
constitutionally authorized to do pursuant to Maryland Constitution Article
XI-B, Section 1 and Article III, Section 40A. The court also cited
Herzinger v. City of Baltimore 79 and Matthaei v. Housing Authority 80 as the
controlling authority. The court referenced Master Royalties Corp. 81 and
Herzinger 82 to support its holding that the use contemplated in this case
was, in fact, public in nature. 83
The court then relied on Murphy v. State Roads Commission84 and
Prince George’s Co. v. Beard, 85 among other cases, to support its holding
that the necessity for a particular condemnation is for the condemnor and
not for the courts to decide, and that the decision of such condemnor is final
so long as it acts reasonably and in good faith. 86 The court further
explained that the record was devoid of any allegation or implication of
improper motive or purpose on the part of the City. 87
In reaching its conclusion, the court applied the premise laid out in
earlier Maryland cases that necessity for a particular condemnation is a
decision for the condemnor, not the courts. The court also applied
Maryland precedent to conclude that the decision of the condemnor is
final—so long as the condemnor has acted reasonably and in good faith. In
the subsequent cases discussed in this Essay, the Court distinguished this
case from unnecessary quick-take condemnation cases. Later cases cite the
“immediate necessity” of remedying a public health hazard as the
distinguishing factor in Free State Realty Co. v. Mayor & City Council of
Baltimore. 88

77. Master Royalties Corp. v. City of Balt., 235 Md. 74, 200 A.2d 652 (1964).
78. Id. at 80–81, 200 A. 2d at 654–55.
79. 203 Md. 49, 62, 98 A.2d 87 (1953).
80. 177 Md. 506, 516 (1939).
81. Master Royalties Corp., 235 Md. at 74, 200 A.2d at 652.
82. Herzinger, 203 Md. at 49, 98 A.2d at 87.
83. Free State Realty Co. v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 235 Md. 550, 557, 369 A.2d
1030, 1034 (1977).
84. 159 Md. 7, 149 A.2d 566 (1930).
85. 266 Md. 83, 291 A.2d 636 (1972).
86. Free State Realty Co., 235 Md. at 558–60, 369 A.2d at 1034–35.
87. Id. at 560, 369 A.2d at 1035.
88. See, e.g., Mayor & City Council of Balt. City v. Valsamaki, 397 Md. 222, 247–49, 916
A.2d 324, 341 (2007).
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B. After Kelo
Following Kelo, the Maryland Court of Appeals has continued to
support the use of eminent domain for economic development. However,
the Court has placed a clear restraint on the use of quick-take condemnation
without “immediate necessity.” 89
1. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore City v. Valsamaki
In Mayor & City Council of Baltimore City v. Valsamaki, 90 the City of
Baltimore (the “City”) appealed from a Circuit Court for Baltimore City
judgment. The City asked the court to answer the question, “Under the
Code of Public Local Laws of Baltimore City, Maryland, §21-16(a), does
the City have the burden to prove ‘necessity’ to proceed with a quick take
condemnation for purposes of economic development?” 91
The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore adopted Ordinance No. 82799 on October 25, 1982, which established the Charles North Urban
Renewal Plan for the Charles North Revitalization Area. 92 The main goal
of the Urban Renewal Plan was to revitalize the Charles North area through
redevelopment in an effort “to create a unique mixed-use neighborhood”
that would enhance the viability of the area and promote the expansion of
business. 93 Mr. Valsamaki’s Bar & Lounge (the “Property”) was located
within the boundaries of the Charles North Revitalization Area as set out by
the City Ordinance.94 The issue before the court arose on March 9, 2006,
when the City acted on Ordinance No. 04-695 and filed a petition for
condemnation and a petition for immediate possession of and title to the
Property in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. 95 The City also attached
an affidavit from the Director of Property Acquisition and Relocation,
Department of Housing and Community Development, that stated, “The
property known as 1924 N. Charles Street . . . must be in possession of the
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore at the earliest possible time in order
to assist in a business expansion in the area.” 96
89. Under “quick-take” condemnation, the municipality takes immediate possession of the
owner’s property with estimated just compensation placed in an escrow account until actual
compensation has been ascertained. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 310 (8th ed. 2004) (referring
to a “quick-take” condemnation as a “quick condemnation,” which is “the immediate taking of
possession of private property for public use, whereby the estimated compensation is deposited in
court or paid to the condemnee until the actual amount of compensation can be established”); see
also Valsamaki, 397 Md. 222, 916 A.2d 324.
90. 397 Md. at 227, 916 A.2d 324 (2007).
91. Id. at 227, 916 A.2d at 327.
92. Id. at 228, 916 A.2d at 327–28.
93. Id. at 229, 916 A.2d at 328.
94. Id., 916 A.2d at 328–29.
95. Id. at 230, 916 A.2d at 329.
96. Id. at 231, 916 A.2d at 329.
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On March 15, 2006, the circuit court granted the City’s petition, and
Mr. Valsamaki timely filed an answer challenging the City’s immediate
need for the Property. 97 At the hearing, two witnesses for the City
explained that upon immediate granting of the title, the City, although not
currently complete, would have a Request for Proposal (“RFP”) ready
within a matter of weeks for potential developers.98 The witnesses further
stated, however, that the City could never predict the results that would
stem from the RFP. 99 The trial court denied the City’s petitions, finding
that the City had failed to demonstrate sufficient grounds to warrant the
finding of necessity requisite for the immediate taking. 100 The City filed a
motion for reconsideration to alter or amend judgment, which was
denied. 101 The City then noted a direct appeal to the Court of Appeals.102
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.103
Under the Code of Public Local Laws of Baltimore City, Md., Section 2116(a), the City must sufficiently demonstrate the reason or reasons why it is
necessary for it to have immediate possession and immediate title to a
particular property via the exercise of a quick-take condemnation.104 The
court held that quick-take condemnation is to be used by the City only when
the public interest demands that it is necessary for property to be
immediately taken. 105 Moreover, the court held that careful scrutiny must
be employed when evaluating the use of quick-take condemnation
procedure “to ensure that its use, in the first place, is supported by the
immediacy.” 106 The court frowned on “quick-take” acquisitions for
“unnamed and unknown developers.” 107
In reviewing the language of the statute, the court reasoned that
Section 21-16 expressly required the City to state reasons relating to
immediacy; “thus the City has the burden not only to present a prima facie
case of public use, but, additionally, in a quick-take action, the burden to
establish the necessity for an immediate taking.” 108 The court, highlighting
the difference between regular eminent domain proceedings and quick-take
condemnation, then compared the case with several other quick-take
97. Id.
98. Id. at 236, 916 A.2d at 332.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 238, 916 A.2d at 334.
101. Id. at 239, 916 A.2d at 334.
102. Id.; see BALT. CITY, MD., CODE OF PUBLIC LOCAL LAWS, § 21-16 (c) (providing “an
immediate right of appeal to the Court of Appeals of Maryland from the decision of the trial
court”).
103. Id. at 227, 916 A.2d at 356.
104. Id. at 245–46, 916 A.2d at 338.
105. Id. at 246, 916 A.2d at 338.
106. Id. at 261, 916 A.2d at 347.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 254, 916 A.2d at 343.
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cases. 109 Like the court in Collington Crossroads, the court in Valsamaki
considered the City Council’s Charles North Urban Renewal Plan
Ordinance in its analysis. However, also like the court in Collington
Crossroads, the court maintained that the question of immediate necessity is
a judicial one which could not be determined by the legislature.110
2. Sapero v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore City
Sapero v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore City 111 took Valsamaki
two steps further, posing similar yet distinct issues: (1) whether the quicktake statute denies due process where the Appellant was not permitted to
conduct and complete discovery; and (2) whether Appellee proved an
immediate need for possession by merely testifying that it was necessary for
“business expansion.” 112
This case arises out of the same redevelopment plan cited in
Valsamaki—the Charles North Urban Renewal Plan for the Charles North
Revitalization Area. 113 On December 8, 2005, the City filed an action for
quick-take condemnation with the circuit court that included a petition for
immediate possession of and title to the identified properties (the
“Properties”). 114 The petition contained the same language and affidavit as
the petition in Valsamaki. 115 At the “right to take” hearing, the President of
Baltimore Development Corporation (“BDC”) and the Director of Planning
and Design/Project Manager for the Charles North area stated that the City
109. See, e.g., Free State Realty Co. v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 279 Md. 550, 369 A.2d
1030 (1977) (finding that, based upon an affidavit, the property constituted an immediate serious
and growing menace to public health, safety, and welfare); Segall v. Mayor & City Council of
Balt., 273 Md. 647, 648, 331 A.2d 298, 298–99 (1975) (finding affidavit showed that all other
properties in the development area had been acquired and sale of the entire site could not be
completed until the subject property had been acquired). But see Mayor & City Council of
Baltimore v. Kelso Corp., 281 Md. 514, 518, 380 A.2d 216, 219 (1977) (finding property owner
never challenged the City’s compliance with the formal requirements of § 21-16 or lack of power
to condemn, and therefore had no basis to attack the City’s quick-take condemnation action);
Kelso Corp. v. Mayor and City Council of Balt., 45 Md. App. 120, 129, 411 A.2d 691, 696 (1980)
(“[The] appellant has failed to show that the City lacked the power or right to condemn its
property.”). The Court of Special Appeals held in Kelso that the desire for the general assemblage
of properties for urban renewal might be sufficient to justify the use of regular condemnation
proceedings, but absent more specific and compelling evidence, does not satisfy the immediacy
and necessity requirements under quick-take condemnation. Kelso Corp., 45 Md. App. at 129,
411 A.2d at 696. The affidavit attached to the petition for immediate possession and title only
provided that immediate possession is necessary “in order to assist in a business expansion in the
area.” Id. This statement, in and of itself, while perhaps sufficient to justify regular
condemnation, did not justify a quick-take condemnation. Id.
110. Valsamaki, 397 Md. at 273, 916 A.2d at 354.
111. 398 Md. 317, 920 A.2d 1061 (2007).
112. Id. at 321, 920 A.2d at 1063.
113. Id. at 323, 920 A.2d at 1064.
114. Id. at 320, 920 A.2d at 1062.
115. Id. at 327, 920 A.2d at 1066–67.
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had already received three proposals to redevelop the Properties. 116
Consequently, the circuit court granted the City’s petitions and denied Mr.
Sapero’s motion to vacate. 117 Mr. Sapero filed a motion to alter or amend
judgment, which the circuit court denied. 118 Mr. Sapero subsequently
appealed directly to the Court of Appeals. 119 In reversing the circuit court,
the Court of Appeals maintained that (1):
Whenever immediate possession is sought, given the minimal
time frame envisioned for proceeding under [Baltimore,
Maryland, Code of Local Public Laws, Section] 21-16, discovery
appropriate to the case should occur, even if the normal discovery
time frames are shortened by order of the court based on a party’s
motion . . . .” 120
The court continued, and (2):
In the case of regular condemnation, once the City establishes
at least a minimal level of public use or purpose, judicial review
may be thereafter limited to determining that the agency’s
decision is not so oppressive, arbitrary or unreasonable as to
suggest bad faith; that, however, is not the case in assessing
immediacy in a quick-take condemnation action [pursuant to
Baltimore, Maryland, Code of Local Public Laws, Section] 2116. Rather, the court must also determine whether there is a
necessity to justify an immediate taking and, in that
determination, must be able to assess the reasons for the
immediacy. [Code of Local Public Laws of Baltimore City,]
Section 21-16 expressly requires the City to state reasons relating
to immediacy, thus the City has the burden not only to present a
prima facie case of public use, but, additionally, in a quick-take
action, the burden to establish the necessity for an immediate
taking. 121
The court reasoned that “[q]uick-take condemnation results in a
deprivation of the constitutionally protected right to property without the
more complete due process protections available in a regular condemnation
action.” 122 The City cited Johnson v. Consolidated Gas, Electric Light &
Power Co. 123 in arguing that the taking only had to be “reasonable under the

116. Id. at 330–33, 920 A.2d at 1069–70.
117. Id. at 330, 920 A.2d at 1068.
118. Id. at 333, 920 A.2d at 1070.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 347, 920 A.2d at 1079.
121. Id. at 335, 920 A.2d at 1071 (quoting Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. Valsamaki, 397
Md. 222, 254, 916 A.2d 324, 343 (2007)).
122. Id. at 338, 920 A.2d at 1073.
123. 187 Md. 454, 50 A.2d 918 (1947).
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circumstances.” 124 However, the court distinguished Johnson, noting that
that case did not involve a quick-take condemnation under Section 21-16. 125
The Sapero court also distinguished Free State Realty Co., noting that there
was no evidence presented that quick-take was necessary for the public’s
health, safety, or immediate welfare, nor was it asserted by admitted
evidence that Mr. Sapero was a “hold-out” of any sort. 126
The court further noted that the City in both Sapero and Valsamaki
never bothered to respond to discovery requests. 127 The Court of Appeals
emphasized that no extreme circumstances existed that warranted
abridgement of procedural due process protections available in regular
condemnation proceedings. 128 Moreover, the City had to respond to
discovery requests in quick-take condemnation cases. 129 The lack of
response to discovery request placed the defendant property owners at a
distinct disadvantage when challenging the City’s right to take the property.
The property owners were unable to counter the City’s arguments and fully
litigate the issues upon which the City’s witnesses testified at the hearing
and were not able to sufficiently prepare.130
3. A&E North, LLC v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore
A&E North, LLC v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore 131 focused on
the relocation concerns of a property owner. The owner, A&E North, LLC
(“A&E”) wanted the City to pay relocation expense prior to the trial for
valuation of the property. 132 Thus, the Court of Appeals was requested to
consider whether “a condemnee [is] entitled to a payment of relocation
expenses in advance of the trial, when the condemnee challenges the
condemning agency’s authority to condemn.” 133
On October 9, 2008, the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore filed a
Petition for Condemnation (regular condemnation) in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City, seeking to condemn A&E’s theater “‘for the public purpose
of urban renewal, pursuant to the Charles/North Revitalization Area Urban
Renewal Plan.’” 134 Six weeks before trial, A&E filed an Emergency
Motion to compel the immediate payment by the City of relocation
expenses, which would allow A&E to move its personal property from the
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Sapero, 398 Md. at 339, 920 A.2d at 1074.
Id. at 340, 920 A.2d at 1074.
Id. at 341–42, 920 A.2d at 1075–76.
Id. at 347, 920 A.2d at 1078.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 339.
431 Md. 253, 64 A.3d 903 (2013).
Id. at 255, 64 A.3d at 905.
Id. at 259–60, 64 A.3d at 907.
Id. at 256, 64 A.3d at 905.
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Parkway Theater prior to trial.135 A&E argued that “‘the presence of the
Personal Property obstruct[ed] the views of the magnificent interior and
[would] cause the jury to discount its value, thereby severely prejudicing
[its] case in the eyes of the jury.’” 136 The circuit court denied both A&E’s
motion for payment and its request for postponement of the trial.137 At the
beginning of the trial, A&E again requested a continuance, citing its lack of
appraisals, the owner’s health, and the continued presence of junk in the
theater, but the court denied the motion.138 The jury returned a verdict
based upon the City’s fair market value of $340,000. 139 Based upon that
judgment, the circuit court entered an inquisition transferring the Property
to the Mayor and City Council.140 A&E then petitioned the Court of
Appeals, which granted both A&E’s petition for a writ of certiorari and the
City’s cross-petition. 141
The Maryland Court of Appeals concluded that, at the time A&E filed
the Emergency Motion, it was not a “displaced person.” 142 Under the
Maryland Real Property Code:
[P]ersons who move themselves or move personal property ‘[a]s
a direct result of a written notice of intent to acquire or the
acquisition of . . . real property in whole or in part by a displacing
agency,’ are considered ‘displaced persons’ and may be entitled
to a payment of their relocation expenses. 143
The Maryland Real Property Code continues, stating:
The purpose of the relocation statutes is to assist with relocation
by providing for (1) reimbursement of actual relocation and
moving expenses and (2) payment of relocation expenses in
advance of the move in hardship cases. While the purpose of a
payment in advance of a move is to facilitate the move, a
payment in advance of trial is “to enhance the Property’s visual
appeal to a jury. 144
According to the court, the latter is not a goal contemplated by the
Relocation Act.145 The court dismissed A&E’s argument that the entity was
entitled to an advance relocation payment prior to trial because the owner
135. Id. at 257, 64 A.3d at 906.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 257, 64 A.3d at 906.
138. Id. at 257–58, 64 A.3d at 906.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 270, 64 A.3d at 914.
143. Id. at 264, 64 A.3d at 910 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. §§ 12-201(e) (1), 205,
210(c) (2) (West 2015)).
144. Id. at 267, 64 A.3d at 912.
145. Id.
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was indigent. 146 The court found that A&E tied the claim of entitlement to
an advance payment to the trial, as opposed to the move. 147 The court
further reasoned that the argument overlooked the circumstances of the
case, namely, that at the time A&E requested an advance payment, it was
contesting the City’s right to condemn the theater.148 Furthermore,
although the argument focused on A&E’s alleged hardship, as in any other
relocation assistance case, the primary consideration before the court was
whether A&E was a “displaced person” at the time it requested
assistance. 149 The court concluded that A&E was not. 150
4. Makowski v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore
Makowski v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore 151 involved the issue
of a “hold out” in a development project.152 “[B]eginning in the 1950s,
Baltimore City, and particularly, the East Baltimore neighborhood, began
losing manufacturing jobs. The City continued to hemorrhage jobs through
the 1990s, causing significant urban decay marked by high crime, high
unemployment, population loss, and a general deterioration in the Middle
East neighborhood.” 153
After a sequence of failed piecemeal redevelopment strategies,
[t]he City, then, turned to more comprehensive redevelopment
and revitalization efforts, including a “non-profit partnership
between government, philanthropists, institutions, and the
community” to undertake a massive revitalization of property in
the East Baltimore community, called the East Baltimore
Development Initiative (“EBDI”). EBDI was intended to
“address, for the first time, on a comprehensive basis the blight
and disinvestment in the neighborhood” through the
redevelopment of an area encompassing 88 acres in proximity to
the Johns Hopkins University Medical Campus; specifically, it
would involve the construction of “biotechnology, research, and
life sciences buildings, a new community school . . . senior
housing . . . mixed income residential homes and rental units,
commercial and retail property, green/open spaces, a new park,
and fresh food stores.” To acquire the properties necessary for
the EBDI project, the City was authorized, pursuant to the
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at 265–66, 64 A.3d at 911.
Id. at 266, 64 A.3d at 911.
Id. at 268, 64 A.3d at 912.
Id.
Id. at 270, 64 A.3d at 914.
439 Md. 169, 94 A.3d 91 (2014).
Id. at 185, 94 A.3d at 101.
Id. at 173, 94 A.3d at 94.
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Baltimore City Ordinance No. 11-453 entitled the “Middle East
Urban Renewal Plan”, to acquire, via voluntary conveyance,
purchase or condemnation, properties in the project area.” 154
The property located at 900–902 N. Chester Street, Baltimore,
Maryland (the “Property”) was situated in the designated urban renewal
area. 155 Before filing a condemnation proceeding, the City negotiated a
rental agreement and a right of entry to the Property. As negotiations
regarding the fair market value of the Property failed, in April of 2012, the
City filed a Petition for Condemnation (regular condemnation) in the circuit
court pursuant to Baltimore City Ordinance Nos. 1202 and 11-453. 156
Prior to trial, the City filed a Petition for Immediate Possession and
Title pursuant to Section 21-16 of the Code of Public Local Laws of
Baltimore City and deposited into the Court Registry the fair market value
of the Property. 157 An affidavit included in the petition indicated that
immediate possession of the Property was necessary and that the City had
effectively acquired title to all other properties on Block 1587, where the
Property was located. 158
The circuit court held a hearing on the City’s right to take the Property
in which the Director of Property Acquisition and Relocation, Department
of Housing and Community Development, was the City’s only witness. 159
He testified,
consistent with his affidavit, that the City had an immediate need
for the [Subject] Property, because the structures on Block 1587
had to be demolished prior to the opening of the school in August
“to mitigate the possible effects of dust and other elements that
would result from having to do the demolition if the school were,
in fact, in session.” He also testified that there were only two
properties that had not yet been acquired on Block 1587 within
two weeks of the hearing—the [Subject] Property and a
church, . . . which the City had acquired in the intervening period
of time between filing of the quick-take petition and the hearing
date. 160
The Circuit Court for Baltimore City concluded that Mr. Makowski
was in fact a “hold-out” and, as a result, granted the City’s quick-take
Petition. 161 Mr. Makowski filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at 175, 94 A.3d at 95.
Id. at 176, 94 A.3d at 95.
Id. at 177, 94 A.3d at 96.
Id.
Id. at 179–80, 94 A.3d at 98.
Id. at 182, 94 A.3d at 99.
Id. at 182, 94 A.3d at 99–100.
Id. at 185, 94 A.3d at 101.
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denied. 162 Thereafter, Mr. Makowski appealed directly to the Court of
Appeals. 163
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court for Baltimore City,
emphasizing “that to prevail in a quick-take condemnation, the City must
prove that the property is being condemned for a public use and that it has
an immediate need to acquire the property.” 164 “[T]he City must provide
specific evidence of an immediate need, not merely a bald assertion that one
exists.” 165 Pursuant to Section 21-16 of the Code of Public Local Laws of
Baltimore City, the City may condemn property via “quick-take”
proceedings to address a “hold-out” situation. 166
A “hold-out” occurs in projects involving property
assemblages, i.e., when multiple properties are assembled for a
single project, where “one or more property owners resist selling,
wanting to be the last owner of a parcel or among the last, in
order to be able to demand higher prices for their property
because they are holding up a large project.167
Furthermore, the court held that neither Valsamaki nor Sapero required
“that the City bear a burden higher than what is traditionally required in
civil cases—a preponderance of the evidence.” 168 The Court of Appeals
agreed with the circuit court’s analysis distinguishing this case from
Valsamaki and found it analogous to Segall v. Mayor & City Council of
Baltimore 169 because the property owner appeared to be taking part in a
hold-out scenario. 170
The question of whether the use of eminent domain for purpose of
economic development is constitutional remains a moot point. The two
justifications for the immediate taking of a property remain the same as in
Valsamaki: (1) if the property is a hold-out; or, (2) if the property poses a
significant risk to public health.171 The court in Makowski, however, did
not reach the merits of the argument that delaying the acquisition of the
property could pose a health risk to students once school began.172

162. Id. at 186–87, 94 A.3d at 102.
163. Id. at 187, 94 A.3d at 102. Mr. Makowski initially appealed to the Court of Special
Appeals. Id. Since quick-take proceedings are appealed directly to the Court of Appeals, his
appeal was transferred to that court. Id.
164. Id. at 190, 94 A.3d at 104.
165. Id. at 191, 94 A.3d at 104.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 191, 94 A.3d at 104–05.
168. Id. at 196 n.25, 94 A.3d at 107.
169. 273 Md. 647, 331 A.2d 298 (1975).
170. Makowski, 439 Md. at 186, 94 A.3d at 102.
171. Id. at 191, 94 A.3d at 104.
172. Id. at 195, 94 A.3d at 107.
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IV. PRACTICE POINTERS AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Baltimore, like most major urban centers, continues to struggle in the
face of intractable poverty, absentee landlords, civil unrest, crime, and an
assorted range of social problems. 173 In Baltimore City, both the State of
Maryland and City of Baltimore governments have used eminent domain to
stimulate private investment for economic development. 174
There are lessons, practice pointers, and policy considerations to be
gleaned from the foregoing cases and experience in Baltimore City. 175
Basic constitutional standards require that no property be taken without just
compensation, that the property is used for a “public purpose,” and that the
property owner receives a fair process, which requires notice and an
opportunity to be heard. 176 Even the most supportive judiciary requires a
legislative process providing authority, a well thought-out plan, and a clear
process when subdivisions seek to acquire property through eminent
domain. During the past decade, a number of issues (i.e., use of regular
condemnation versus quick-take, the basis for condemnation, right to take,
and fair market value) have been confronted in the defense of condemnation
cases for the City of Baltimore. 177 The following is advice offered to
overcome the charges of eminent domain abuse, and to facilitate the
government’s redevelopment of blighted and/or undeveloped areas:
1. Keep legislative authorization updated and current. Most codes
have provisions for emergency situations; however, sunset determinations
negate ad infinitum authority for legislative authorization. The Maryland
legislature has recognized the need to decrease the amount of time that

173. The Baltimore City Police Department documents crime statistics. See generally OPEN
BALTIMORE, https://data.baltimorecity.gov (last visited Jan. 28, 2016). See also, CENSUS 2010,
http://census.maryland.gov/census2010/pl-total (last visited Feb. 2, 2016). The Census documents
population decline, vacant housing, and disinvestment, among issues.
174. Oriole Park at Camden Yards and M&T Bank stadium, home to the Ravens franchise, are
prime examples of state projects that were developed with the assistance of eminent domain.
These venues have spurred a range of residential and commercial development to support the
athletic events they hold. See Maryland Stadium Authority, MARYLAND MANUAL ON-LINE: A
GUIDE
TO
MARYLAND
&
ITS
GOVERNMENT
http://msa.maryland.gov/msa/mdmanual/25ind/html/66stadf.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2016). The
state-funded Hippodrome Theatre project in 2004, which revitalized the 2300-seat theatre built in
1914, is another project that set in motion the vitalization of the City’s West Side community (that
is, the west side of the former central business district). Eminent domain was used on the West
Side Community Project to stimulate a comprehensive approach. While the redevelopment has
lagged during the economic downturn since 2008, development continues.
175. Andrew G. Bailey & Elva E. Tillman, Practice Pointers and Policy Considerations for the
Responsible Use of Eminent Domain Post-Kelo (September 10-14, 2014) (paper presented at the
International Municipal Lawyers Association (“IMLA”), 2014 Annual Conference, Baltimore,
Maryland) (on file with author and included in the Municipal Lawyers Magazine, Sept.—Oct.,
2014, available to IMLA members ).
176. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
177. See generally cases cited in supra Section III.B.
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governmental entities have to bring condemnation actions. 178 Legislative
authorizations typically include notice and opportunity to be heard. In
Baltimore, such authorization has taken the form of urban renewal plans. 179
Citizen participation in these plans is very high. The planning commission
and the city council hearings afford opportunities for the affected
population to review plans and to be heard. These opportunities to be heard
are available for not only people living in the area, but also for those who
work and own property in the area. 180
2. Acquire property pursuant to a well-reasoned plan that is supported
by a legitimate legislative process. Property should not be acquired to be
stockpiled. 181 All of the Maryland cases discussed in this Essay indicate
that a well-reasoned plan is preferred. The use of eminent domain is a
serious threat to individual property rights. That use should be tempered by
the development of a plan that provides significant impact for public use
and/or benefit.
3. Support public purpose through public benefit, if not public use. If
we use eminent domain for economic development it is clear that not all
projects will be for the use of the public “at large.” However, we can be
certain that each project is grounded in public benefit, that is, it is not a
project so narrowly drawn that a minimal number of people will benefit
from it.
4. Provide relocation to assist in making the property owner whole.
The federal and state governments define a “displaced person” as one who
moves as a result of the acquisition of a property for public use. 182 A
displaced person can include any individual, family, partnership,
corporation or association. The aim is to formulate and follow a uniform
policy for the fair and equitable treatment of displaced persons. 183
5. Mediate the valuation of the property. Experience has indicated
that condemnation cases are complex matters, involving the right to take
and valuation. It is always better to have the parties decide the valuation in
a collaborative manner instead of a disinterested person (i.e., a judge or
178. Maryland Annotated Code, Real Property Article § 12-105.1 was added to the annotated
code. Prior to this amendment the State and its local subdivisions had an unfettered ability to take
property at any time. Section 12-105.1 initially reflected a three year time limit for taking
property but was amended to afford the State and its subdivisions four years to file a petition for
condemnation.
179. See BALT., MD, BALT. CITY CODE art. 13, § 2-6 (2015).
180. The hearing requirements are laid out for Urban Renewal Plans in BALTIMORE CITY
CODE art. 13, § 2-6(d).
181. See Mayor & City Council of Balt. City v. Valsamaki, 397 Md. 222, 261, 916 A.2d 324,
347 (2007).
182. See, e.g., Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of
1970, Pub. L. No.91-646, 84 Stat. 1894 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601–4655 (2012); see also A &
E North, LLC v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 431 Md. 253, 64 A.3d 903 (2013).
183. Id.
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jury). In a condemnation case, it can take a year to finally get to trial. A
final verdict can result in appeals which can lengthen an already long
process. Mediation affords a final resolution and an opportunity to
conclude the case.

